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This paper presents evidence that the existence of deposit and lending
facilities combined with an averaging provision for the reserve requirement
are powerful tools to stabilize the overnight rate. We reach this conclusion
by comparing the behavior of this rate in Germany before and after the
start of Stage III of the EMU. The analysis of the German experience
is useful because it allows us to isolate the e¤ects on the overnight rate
of these particular instruments of monetary policy. To show that this
outcome is a general conclusion and not a particular result of the German
market, we develop a theoretical model of reserve management which is
able to reproduce our empirical …ndings.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The daily market for funds is the generic denomination for the market where
…nancial institutions trade overnight unsecured loans of their deposits at the
central bank. The interest rate set in this market (henceforth called, indistinctly,
the overnight rate, or the daily rate) plays a key role for the conduct of monetary
policy. This is because the operating procedures of central banks are designed
to a¤ect the supply and demand of reserves among …nancial institutions.
Which are the determinants of the overnight rate? Central banks try to con-
trol it by using the instruments in their hands, namely, open market operations,
reserve requirements and standing facilities. Control means an attempt to keep
the daily rate around an “o¢cial rate” which in some countries is a “target rate”
and in others is just the rate of the open market operations. One consequence
of this control is that daily rates closely follow the rates determined by central
banks. However, since this control is not perfect, the spread between market
rates and o¢cial rates is usually di¤erent than zero. This di¤erence gives an
indication of the part of the daily rate which is driven by market forces. Figure 1
presents an example of such a series. It shows the spread between the overnight
rate and the rate of the main re…nancing operations in Germany for the period
covering from September 1, 1996 until May 23, 2000. The dashed vertical lines
represent the end of reserve maintenance periods.
The most remarkable feature of this series is the outstanding di¤erences in
its behavior before and after January 1999. Before this date, the last days of
the reserve maintenance periods were characterized by signi…cant peaks in the
spread, which disappeared once the EMU was in place. Additionally, although
it is less evident from the graph, the volatility before the start of Stage III was
larger than after the beginning of the EMU.
This paper deals with characterizing and explaining such a dramatic change
on the behavior of the overnight rate in Germany. We believe that this discussion
goes beyond analyzing a particular historical episode in a particular country. On
the contrary, we argue that it helps us understand the role of fundamental forces
determining the time series properties of this rate in any economy. What makes
the German experience with the EMU a singular one is that it represents the
closest we can get to a controlled experiment in Macroeconomics. We show that
this experiment allows us to trace the e¤ect on the daily rate of changes in the
operating procedures of central banks. In particular, it provides us with a way
of evaluating the likely impact that the beginning of Stage III has had on the
behavior of this rate in the Euro-area.
We develop a model to reproduce our empirical …ndings. This means ex-
plaining not only the properties of the overnight rate in the pre- and post-EMU
periods but also the sudden change in its behavior. The explanation is based on
modeling the degree of substitutability of funds within the reserve maintenance
period. It is commonly said that if banks are risk neutral and there are no
market frictions, funds should be perfect substitutes among days of the same
reserve maintenance period. This would imply that banks would arbitrage away
any expected di¤erences between the current and future cost of funds. In other
2words, overnight rates should follow a martingale.
The main contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that this conclusion
is not true even in an environment where agents are risk neutral and there are
no impediments to trade. We reach this outcome by formalizing the instrumen-
tation of monetary policy and by showing how it has di¤erent e¤ects on the
opportunity cost of funds for di¤erent days in the same reserve maintenance pe-
riod. The corollary of this result is that banks do not see funds on di¤erent days
as perfect substitutes. In addition, it allows us to rationalize the changes in the
behavior of the overnight rate by comparing the implementation of monetary
policy before and after the EMU.
The line of the argument is developed as follows. Section 2 characterizes
the time series properties of the spread between the daily rate and the rate of
the main re…nancing operations in Germany. We show that there is a structural
break in this series associated with the EMU. In particular, before January 1999,
we …nd a signi…cant increase in both the conditional mean and variance of the
daily rate at the end of the reserve maintenance period. This e¤ect is lost after
1999. Section 3 discusses why we concentrate in the German case and provides
possible explanations for our empirical …ndings. It turns out that existing the-
ories of the determination of the overnight rate within the reserve maintenance
period have di¢culties in explaining this episode. Section 4 associates these
results with the changes in the implementation of monetary policy observed in
Germany since the beginning of 1999. We develop a model of competitive, risk-
neutral banks which is able to reproduce the features we …nd in the data. In
this sense, the model generates a process for the overnight rate with increased
volatility and peaks in the mean at the end of the maintenance period. We show
that these features of the daily rate crucially depend on the rates of the central
bank’s standing facilities. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The Empirical Analysis
2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The sample consists of daily observations covering the period from September
1, 1996 until May 23rd, 2000. For the period before January 1999, we use the
spread between the overnight rate determined in the German money market
and the rate of the main re…nancing operations of the Bundesbank. The sample
starts on September 1, 1996. We have 581 observations for this period. Af-
ter January 1, 1999, the series studied is the di¤erence between the Eonia and
the rate of the main re…nancing operations of the ESCB. The Eonia is a vol-
ume weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending transactions initiated
within the euro area by a particular panel of banks. The contributors to Eo-
nia are the banks with the highest volume of business in the euro zone money
markets.1 This series is indistinguishable from the corresponding interest rate
1In particular, these are 47 banks from EMU countries; 4 banks from non-EMU European
countries; and 6 large international banks from non-EU countries but with important euro
3in the German money market for that period. We have 357 observations of this
variable from January 1, 1999 to May 23rd, 2000. Our linked series, therefore,
includes a total of 939 observations and describes the part of the overnight rate
determined by market forces. It is plotted in Figure 1.
A lot of useful information can be found by looking at some descriptive
statistics of this series. Before January 1999, the overnight rate tended to show
a peak at the end of the reserve maintenance periods. These peaks do not
appear after the start of Stage III of the EMU. Also, as it was said in the
Introduction, the volatility of this series is di¤erent for each subsample. Two
distinctive properties de…ne these di¤erences. First, the variance of the spread
before January 1999 is 0.043 and it is only 0.035 after that date. Second, if we
eliminate from the samples the last and the …rst days of the reserve maintenance
periods, the variance drops to 0.008 in the …rst subsample and to 0.024 in the
second subsample. This means that, before the start of Stage III, the variance
associated with settlement days was responsible for explaining over 81% of the
total volatility of the series. With the beginning of the EMU, this percentage
has been reduced to 31%.
Another important piece of information can be found by computing the aver-
age spread for each day of the reserve maintenance period. These computations
are shown in Figures 2 and 3 for the …rst and second subsample, respectively.
The dotted lines represent two standard error bands. As shown in the …gures,
before the EMU there is a clear increase in the unconditional mean and variance
of the series on the last 2 days of the period. However, after the EMU, both
the unconditional mean and variance are distributed more uniformly within the
period.
The next subsection speci…es a univariate model to describe the time series
properties of the series as well as to perform statistical tests on the changes in its
behavior. Nevertheless, this model does not pretend to be a full characterization
of the overnight rates. In order to do that we would need to include the supply
of funds and to construct a general equilibrium model as in Bindseil [2]. The
purpose of this estimation is just to show some empirical regularities found in
the data.
2.2 The Econometric Model
Linear analysis is usually inappropriate in …nancial econometrics. An extensive
literature has shown the non-linearities that characterize most of the …nancial
variables. Our series is not an exception. Just by looking at Figure 1, we can see
that the days close to the end of the maintenance period, depicted in the graph
by vertical lines, usually present higher uncertainty. Most of the “atypical”
observations (in a linear sense) are associated with these days. For example, if
we construct a two standard error band around it, we can observe that most of
the times in which this variable is out of that interval, happen during the last
zone operations. For more information on this rate, see the European Banking Federation’s
internet page for the Euribor at www.euribor.org.
4two days of the maintenance periods. In particular, before January 1999, it is
26 times outside this band, 25 of which are on the last two days of the period.
After the EMU, this ratio is just 22 to 13.
In addition, an important deviation from the linear model is related to con-
ditional heteroskedasticity problems. We encompass all these facts by proposing
the following econometric speci…cation:
it = it¡1 + ¯


























where it is the overnight rate, Xt collects a set of explanatory dummies that
potentially could a¤ect the mean while and Vt includes the ones that a¤ect the
variance.2 The functional form of the variance comes from the speci…cation
proposed by Nelson [9] and used in Hamilton [8]. This speci…cation captures
an EGARCH type of persistence but allowing for di¤erent e¤ects of positive
and negative shocks. It also takes out the e¤ect of changing the unconditional
variance from the transmission of the conditional variance in day t ¡ j to day
t [represented by the term ln(ht¡j) ¡ ¸
0Vt¡j] For the distribution of the error
term, we use the mixture of normals proposed in Hamilton [8], because the
fat tails and the excess of kurtosis made inappropriate the use of the normal


























As in Hamilton [8], we use the normalization, ¾2
1 =1which implies that E(²2
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After an extensive search, we conclude that the sets Xt and Vt are composed
of the variables included in Tables 1 and 2.3
2In the econometric speci…cation we use the overnight rate instead of the spread. This
is because we construct a model in …rst di¤erences and, therefore, the level of the rate is
not an issue. The use of the spread would generate an unnecessary noise in the estimation
since markets participants usually discount changes in the o¢cial rates at the beginning of
the reserve maintenance period while they usually occur within the period.
3Hamilton [8] considers a more sophisticated model for the …rst day of the new reserve
maintenance period. In contrast, our speci…cation is simpler because our sample includes a
small number of observations for these days due to the longer reserve maintenance period.
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Variables in the Mean Equation (set Xt)
Variable Meaning
X1t t occurs before January 1st,1 9 9 9
X2t t occurs after January 1st,1 9 9 9
X3t t occurs before January 1st, 1999 and is one of the
last 2 days of the reserve maintenance period
X4t t occurs after January 1st, 1999 and is one of the
last 4 days of the reserve maintenance period
X5t t occurs before January 1st,1 9 9 9a n di st h e… r s t
day of the reserve maintenance period
X6t t occurs after January 1st,1 9 9 9a n di st h e… r s td a y
of the reserve maintenance period
Table 2
Variables in the Variance Equation (set Vt)
Variable Meaning
V1t t occurs before January 1st,1 9 9 9
V2t t occurs after January 1st,1 9 9 9
V3t t occurs before January 1st, 1999 and is one of the last 3
days or the …rst day of the reserve maintenance period
V4t t occurs after January 1st, 1999 and is one of the last 4
days or the …rst day of the reserve maintenance period
2.3 Results
Tables 3 and 4 show the coe¢cient estimates.
Table 3
Estimations in the Mean Equation
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As Table 3 shows, the behavior of the overnight rate is completely di¤erent
before and after January 1999. Before the EMU, the positive and signi…cant
value of ¯3 implies that there is an increase of rates at the end of the maintenance
period, with an associated negative variation at the beginning as measured
by the parameter ¯5, the increase in the rate on the …rst day of the reserve
maintenance period. Interestingly, the total increase of the spread on the last
two days of the maintenance period equals 74 basis points which is very close
to the value for ¯5: We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 2 £¯3 = ¯5 (the
p-value of the test is 0.84). This means that the …rst day of the period washed
out any changes occurred around the previous settlement day. After the EMU,
there is a signi…cant decrease of rates the last four days of the maintenance
period, (¯4 < 0) also compensated with a signi…cant increase at the beginning
of the …rst day of the next period. In this case, we accept the null hypothesis
of 4 £ ¯4 +0 :05 = ¯6 (with a p-value of 0.07). The “over-compensation” of
the …rst day of the reserve maintenance period comes from the expectation of
changes in the main re…nancing operations rate, which has su¤ered during these
16 periods an increase of 75 basis points. These 75 basis points imply an average
increase of around 5 basis points per maintenance period. Additionally, contrary
to the …ndings for the US case (Hamilton [8]), there is no signi…cant e¤ect of
variables such as holidays or end-of-the week. This is probably due to the longer
maintenance period in Europe.
With respect to the variance, the positive values of ¸3 and ¸4 indicate that
volatility tends to be larger at the end of the reserve maintenance period both be-
fore and after the EMU. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that ¸3 >¸ 4
which means that volatility has increased more before than after the EMU. The
p-value of the hypothesis ¸3 = ¸4 is 0.002. On the other hand, the signi…cant
positive value of the di¤erence between ¸2 and ¸1 implies that the volatility
of the overnight rate for the rest of the days within the reserve maintenance
7period has been higher in the Third Stage of the EMU as compared with the
one observed before 1999. The p-value of the hypothesis ¸2 = ¸1 is 0.01.
Finally, a technical point deserve special attention. We impose in the esti-
mation the null that the overnight rate during the reserve maintenance period
follows a martingale or, equivalently, that banks consider funds as perfect sub-
stitutes during the maintenance period. We pretend to describe in the next
sections of the paper the reasons that explains deviations of this null hypothe-
sis.
3 Discussion of our Empirical Results
In this section we explain why we concentrate in the German experience with
the EMU and discuss possible explanations for our empirical …ndings. First of
all, the EMU seems a natural experiment to analyze. At least in principle, it
is possible to identify all the institutional changes that this historical episode
generated in the money markets of the Euro area. One of the main modi…-
cations in these markets has to do with the conduct of monetary policy. In
this respect, most of the countries that initially entered the monetary union
changed the instruments of their central banks so much that it is di¢cult to
use their experience to learn anything about the determination of the overnight
rate. Germany is the country with the most similar institutional framework
before and after the EMU.4 This means that we have to …nd a justi…cation for
our empirical results by searching within a limited set of possible answers. It is
in this sense that Germany provides an interesting case to study and, as it will
be clearer in the next section, by doing this exercise we learn some important
lessons that should be applicable to any country.
What has been di¤erent in German money markets since January 1999? The
…rst thing that comes to our minds is the increase in the number of participants.
With the EMU, potentially any bank in the Euro area can have access to the
German market to obtain liquidity. Can this fact explain our observations on
the daily rate? The only way more agents could have any e¤ect on the behavior
of the rate is if they were di¤erent as compared with the existing ones. In par-
ticular, the only way the price of that market could have a lower volatility is if
the liquidity shocks of newcomers were very negatively correlated with the liq-
uidity shocks of the banks already installed. However, it is surprising that this
negative correlation of shocks only a¤ects the last day of the maintenance pe-
riod. Additionally, the main source of volatility in the Euro-area comes from the
Treasury deposits.5 The standard deviation of the daily changes of government
deposits since the start of Stage III of the EMU is Euro 5,507 million, whereas
it is Euro 963 million for banknotes and Euro 506 million for net foreign assets.
Germany does not have any volatility coming from Treasury deposits because
the Bundesbank had an agreement with the German Treasury to deposit the
4See Escrivá and Fagan [5] for a description of the operating procedures of central banks
i nt h eE u r oa r e ab e f o r et h eE M U .
5European Central Bank [7], p. 16.
8Treasury balances at the end of the day in private banks. On the other hand, it
is Italy, Spain, and to a lesser extent, France, Ireland and Portugal, the coun-
tries where the Treasury balances represent a source of volatility for the money
markets. Only if the Treasury shocks for these countries were very negatively
correlated with banknote shocks in Germany we could have some smoothing
e¤ect on the German market. To think that something like that could happen
is pretty adventurous.
With respect to the supply of reserves, it may be possible that di¤erences
in the behavior of the Bundesbank and the ESCB could explain the observed
pattern of the overnight rate. This would explain the data only if the Bundes-
bank had restricted the supply of reserves at the end of the maintenance periods
and the ESCB had not done so. It has been recognized that the Bundesbank
tended to be harder on the market on the last day of maintenance periods. The
reason was that, by maintaining the market shorter they avoided the possibility
of rates dropping to zero on those days. On the other hand, it has been also
recognized that the ESCB has provided a lot of liquidity, especially during the
…rst months after the beginning of Stage III. The fear in this case was that liq-
uidity was not circulating e¢ciently while agents were learning the new system.
However, several problems arise when using these interpretations at face value.
On the one hand, it is not clear how these policies can explain the di¤erences
in volatility. On the other hand, it does not provide an explanation as of why
…nancial institutions did not take advantage of this situation. If German banks
knew that it was systematically harder to get reserves at the end of the reserve
maintenance periods, why did they keep demanding reserves on those days?
This discussion brings us to the crux of the matter. One of the central
…ndings of the previous section is that we can reject the martingale hypothesis
for the overnight rate for both subsamples; that is, we can reject the hypothesis
that
it = E [it+1j©t];
where ©t represents the information set at time t. The idea behind this hy-
pothesis is that risk-neutral banks together with an averaging provision for the
reserve requirement will make …nancial institutions arbitrage away any misalign-
ment between the current rate and its expected future value. An implication of
accepting this proposition is that banks should be looking at funds at di¤erent
days as perfect substitutes within the same maintenance period. Another set
of explanations for our …ndings, then, arises from analyzing the reasons the lit-
erature has given to rationalize observed deviations of the daily rate from the
martingale behavior.
The two obvious candidates to justify lack of substitutability of funds are
risk aversion and impediments to trade. So it is of no surprise that the pa-
pers covering this issue assume one of them or both. For example, Hamilton
[8] develops a model in which risk aversion together with reserve accounting
conventions, transaction costs and credit line limits can reproduce the observed
decrease in the level of the Fed funds rate on Fridays in particular, and over the
9reserve maintenance period in general. In Bartolini et al. [1], risk aversion and
transaction costs are responsible for explaining why the level of the overnight
rate as well as holdings of reserves tend to increase on settlement day. Another
possibility has been provided by Campbell [3]. He uses risk aversion, transac-
tion costs and information problems among banks about the level of aggregate
reserve demand to generate more volatility of the funds rate towards the end of
the reserve maintenance period. Spindt and Ho¤meister [11] are able to explain
this increase in volatility with a model where a market maker dealer adjusts bid
and ask rates to maximize pro…ts subject to satisfying a reserve requirement.
In such a model, reserve accounting conventions also play a central role.
Although these are valid reasons to rationalize deviations from the martin-
gale behavior, they will hardly account for the fact that these deviations were
so di¤erent before and after January 1999. In general, they would mean that
the EMU has had a signi…cant e¤ect on bank’s attitudes toward risk, transac-
tion costs or available information, conjectures which are di¢cult to sustain.
Additionally, when we try to use these models, there is some feature of the
data that is left unexplained. For example, Hamilton’s model is not designed
to explain peaks at the end of the reserve maintenance period and is silent as
to its implications for the variance of the overnight rate, a feature shared with
Bartolini et al. [1]. Campbell’s analysis is local around the full information so-
lution and the implications for the level of the rate depend on parameter values.
Finally, Spindt and Ho¤meister’s results depend on the degree of market power
by dealers, which, presumably, has decreased after the uni…cation.
Still, the fact that the martingale hypothesis is rejected is an indication that
funds on di¤erent days within the same reserve maintenance period are not per-
fect substitutes. In this paper, instead of generating this lack of substitutability
by assuming risk averse agents or impediments to trade, we do so by modeling
the role of the operating procedures of central banks in the determination of the
overnight rate. In particular, we will show that these instruments of monetary
policy make the cost structure of agents demanding reserves in money markets
to be non-linear. It is this non-linearity what makes risk neutral agents to be-
have as if they were risk averse and it is this type of behavior what reduces the
substitutability of funds across days.
We then use this results to explain the properties of the overnight rate in
Germany by analyzing the changes in the operating procedures of the ESCB as
compared with the ones of the Bundesbank.6 These changes are:
² With respect to reserve requirements, both the Bundesbank and the ESCB
have imposed a reserve maintenance period of one month. This period
covered a calendar month in Germany whereas after 1999 it usually starts
on the 24th of one month and ends on the 23rd of the following month.
Reserves were not remunerated in Germany. On the contrary, the ESCB
remunerates required reserves at the average rate of its main re…nancing
operations.
6For more details about the operating procedures of the Bundesbank and the ESCB see
Deustche Bundesbank [4] and European Central Bank [6].
10² The conduct of open market operations has been almost identical. In
both cases they are the main source of liquidity for the system. Although
divided in several categories, main re…nancing operations have been the
most important of them in both periods. These operations were conducted
weekly, under a …xed-rate system, and had similar maturities.
² Finally, both the Bundesbank and the ESCB have maintained a marginal
lending facility (called Lombard loans in the case of Germany). Under
normal circumstances, access to this facility was not limited by the central
banks. This lending rate have provided an upper limit for the overnight
rate. In this respect, the ESCB has introduced a marginal deposit facility
that was not in place in Germany before 1999. Financial institutions use
this facility to make overnight deposits with national central banks. The
rate of this facility provides now a ‡oor for the overnight rate.
Could any of these di¤erences explain the observed changes in the behavior of
the daily rate in Germany? First, the remuneration of required reserves does not
seem to have had any e¤ect. This remuneration is paid after settlement day and,
therefore, acts as a constant in the management problem of banks not a¤ecting
their decisions on reserve holdings. Secondly, the change in the ending day of
the reserve maintenance period, if something, should have increased volatility.
This is because main payment activities to the Treasury in Italy take place on
the 23rd of each month. This may increase the volatility of the German market
if Italian banks use it to obtain additional liquidity. Finally, the only possibility
left is to see whether the introduction of the deposit facility by the ESCB can
rationalize our empirical …ndings. This is the topic of the next section.
4 A Theoretical Model of the Overnight Rate
4.1 Overview of the Model
We construct a model where the interest rates of the central bank’s two standing
facilities will play a crucial role in determining the behavior of the daily rate over
the reserve maintenance period. The model consists of identical, risk-neutral
banks that exchange reserves in a competitive fashion. These agents demand
reserves because they have to satisfy a reserve requirement imposed by a central
bank. Furthermore, funds can be transferred between banks at no cost and there
are no credit limits on their borrowing activities. Finally, there are no problems
of private information in this economy. All variables are publicly known.
Our model tries to explain the data from the demand side. We want to
show that an active monetary policy is not necessary to reproduce the observed
behavior of the interest rate. For this reason we assume that the central bank
does not intervene to modify the total liquidity of the system. The overall supply
of reserves only changes unexpectedly from autonomous sources described by
an exogenous, aggregate shock to the level of reserves of each bank. This shock
11is modeled as an i.i.d., zero mean random variable whose realization is known
after the market is closed every day.
The last piece of the model is the speci…cation of the marginal facilities
the central bank provides to …nancial institutions. First, assume that there
is only a lending facility where commercial banks can get liquidity after the
shock is realized. Of course, the interest of these loans should be above the
one in the market. When banks determine the demand for reserves they will
balance several costs and gains. On the one hand, banks weight static,i n t r a d a y
costs. For that, they compare the opportunity cost of holding one additional
unit of reserves (measured by the lost daily rate) with the marginal gain of not
borrowing from the central bank (i.e., the lending rate). On the other hand,
there are also dynamic costs. They have to do with the probability of having too
much reserves at the end of the reserve maintenance period. This probability
increases as banks accumulate reserves.
In this setup, how would the demand schedule for reserves behave over the
reserve maintenance period? In other words, for each interest rate, would be
optimal to have a constant demand for reserves? With a constant demand for
reserves the static costs are constant over time. However, the dynamic costs are
larger as time passes. Banks anticipate this e¤ect by decreasing their demand
for reserves at the beginning of the period and increasing it towards the end
of the period. This behavior puts upward pressure on the daily rate as we get
c l o s e rt os e t t l e m e n td a y . A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h em a r k e tr a t es h o u l dg e tm o r e
volatile since possible histories for the state are more diverse as shocks keep
hitting the system.
With this model, it is also possible to conclude that the introduction of a
deposit facility should reduce the e¤ects of time on both the level and the vari-
ability of the market rate. First, by remunerating excess reserves, the facility
reduces the costs of having more reserves than what is required by the central
bank. This stabilizes the demand for reserves throughout the reserve main-
tenance period.7 Second, by reducing the interval where the market rate can
‡uctuate, it also decreases its volatility. The following subsections reproduce
these ideas in a formal model.
4.2 The Setup
This section develops a model of the overnight rate. It builds on the reserve
management problem of a price-taking, representative bank. Implicitly, it is
assumed that there exists a continuum of identical banks with measure one,
each solving the same problem described here. The only perturbations hitting
the system are aggregate shocks. Thus, there are no idiosyncratic risks and all
aggregate variables coincide with their individual counterparts.
7Throughout the paper, the term “excess reserves” is used in a broad sense to indicate
all reserves that are not required. They include reserves deposited at the deposit facility of
the central bank. It is, therefore, a more general concept than the one used in the banking
industry which refers to idle reserves, that is, reserves that are neither required nor deposited
in the deposit facility.
12Assume the central bank requires …nancial institutions to maintain a total
of reserves of R monetary units over a reserve maintenance period of T days.
Denote by At the accumulated reserves at the beginning of day t by the represen-
tative bank. The initial wealth of this bank is divided into reserves voluntarily
deposited at the central bank (Mt) and reserves loaned to other banks in the
money market (Bt), that is,
At = Mt + Bt (4)
with
Mt ¸ 0:
Reserves are exchanged in the market at the interest rate it. Assume that after
banks have gone to the market they receive an aggregate liquidity shock ²t.
This shock is i.i.d. with zero mean and probability distribution function F (²).
It takes the same value for all banks.
The representative bank ends up the day with a balance in the central bank
of Mt+²t. It is assumed that any …nancial institution has unrestricted access to
the central bank’s marginal lending facility at the interest rate il. This means
that if the end of day’s balance is negative, the bank has to borrow from the
central bank the funds needed to set it back to zero. If the bank ends up with a
positive balance, those reserves work towards satisfying the reserve requirement.
Denote by Rt the increase in reserves accounted for the requirement,
Rt =m a xf0;M t + ²tg






The reserve requirement is ful…lled if
LT ¸ R: (5)
De…ne by et the reserves needed in t to ful…ll the reserve requirement for the
whole maintenance period, that is,
et ´ maxf0;R¡ Lt¡1g:
Another way of writing (5) is
eT+1 =0 :
Once the reserve requirement is ful…lled, …nancial institutions can deposit excess
reserves at the central bank. These deposits are remunerated at the interest rate
13id. It is assumed that il >i d. In this model, required reserves do not earn any
interest.
The objective of this bank is to decide on a sequence for fMtg
T
t=1 to maximize







At+1 =( 1+it)At + ²t ¡ ct
for t =1 ;2;:::;T,w h e r ect represents the net costs the bank incurs in managing
its reserves. This term includes the opportunity cost of holding reserves (itMt)
but also comprises the interest paid on borrowing from the central bank net of
the interest received from maintaining reserves there. The only information the
bank needs to make its decision on Mt every day t, apart from interest rates,
is its level of reserves At and its reserve de…ciency et.T h e w a y t o s o l v e t h i s
problem is by backward induction. With this method, we …rst solve the problem
at date T, and then work backwards towards the beginning of the maintenance
period.
4.3 Solution of the Model
4.3.1 Problem at T
The problem of an individual bank is to maximize with respect to MT
ET (AT+1)
with
AT+1 =( 1+iT)AT + ²T ¡ cT;
given its initial accumulated reserves, AT, its reserve de…ciency, eT,a n dt h e
market’s interest rate, iT. The important point is to compute the variable cT.
For any bank, total reserves at the end of the day are MT + ²T.G i v e nt h e
reserves voluntarily accumulated at the beginning of the day (MT)a n dg i v e n
the reserve de…ciency (eT), the reserve requirement will be ful…lled depending
on the value of the liquidity shock that day. For small shocks, that is, for shocks
satisfying
²T · eT ¡ MT;
the reserve requirement will not be satis…ed. This situation will imply a cost
for the bank of
il (eT ¡ MT ¡ ²T) for all ²T · eT ¡ MT:
14On the other hand, for large shocks, that is, for shocks satisfying
²T ¸ eT ¡ MT;
the requirement will be satis…ed. Since excess reserves can be deposited at the
deposit facility, the gain (negative cost) in this case is
id (MT + ²T ¡ eT) for all ²T ¸ eT ¡ MT:
This makes the net cost of managing reserves equal to
cT = iTMT + il (eT ¡ MT ¡ ²T)I f²T · eT ¡ MTg
+id (eT ¡ MT ¡ ²T)I f²T ¸ eT ¡ MTg
where I fXg is an indicator function taking value 1 if event X occurs.
I tc o u l da l s oh a p p e nt h a teT =0 . In this case, the bank has already satis…ed
the reserve requirement with the reserves accumulated up to time T ¡ 1.W e
denote this situation by saying that the bank is “locked-in”. The only possible
costs and gains are the ones associated with …nishing the day with a negative
or positive balance at the central bank. This makes the variable cT equal to
cT = iTMT ¡ il (MT + ²T)I f²T ·¡ MTg¡id (MT + ²T)I f²T ¸¡ MTg:
The problem faced by this bank is summarized by the function
V (AT;e T;i T)= m a x
MT
ET (AT+1):
This expectation takes the value
ET (AT+1)=( 1 + iT)AT ¡ iTMT ¡ id
1 Z
eT¡MT




(eT ¡ MT ¡ ²T)f (²T)d²T: (6)
It is important to notice that the presence of the standing facilities makes this
expression non-linear with respect to the choice variable MT.
The …rst order condition for a maximum is
iT = ilF (eT ¡ MT)+id [1 ¡ F (eT ¡ MT)]: (7)
Using (4), the supply of funds in the market is






It is easy to show that the supply of funds is a positive function of the market
rate (iT), and the initial level of reserves (AT), and a negative function of the
reserve de…ciency (eT), the lending rate (il) and the deposit rate (id).
15Given that the shock is aggregate, all banks are identical so individual de-
cisions coincide with aggregate variables. In equilibrium it has to be the case
that BT =0 ,a n dMT = AT. This means that the equilibrium interest rate if
the economy is not locked-in (eT > 0) is
iT (eT > 0) = id +
¡
il ¡ id¢
F (eT ¡ AT): (8)
This result is intuitive. The market interest rate di¤erential with respect to the
deposit rate is equal to its expected value if the market were to be open after
the shock. That di¤erential would be il ¡ id if the system as a whole does not
have enough liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirement and needs to borrow
from the central bank, and zero if there is excess liquidity in the system. The
equilibrium interest rate if the system as a whole is locked-in (eT =0 )i s




This expression has the same intuition as above. It is immediate to show that
id · iT (eT =0 )· iT (eT > 0) · il:
The value function is equal to
V (AT;e T;i T)= AT ¡ il
eT¡AT Z
¡1




(eT ¡ AT ¡ ²T)f (²T)d²T: (10)
Although included for the sake of completeness, this expression no longer de-
pends on iT.
4.3.2 Problem at T ¡ 1
The problem is to maximize with respect to MT¡1
ET¡1 (AT+1)
when the expectation is evaluated at the equilibrium level computed before.
This problem can be expressed as





ET¡1 [V (AT;e T;i T)] (11)
with
AT =( 1+iT¡1)AT¡1 + ²T¡1 ¡ cT¡1 (12)
16and
eT =m a x f0;R¡ LT¡1g =m a xf0;R¡ LT¡2 ¡ RT¡1g
=m a x f0;e T¡1 ¡ max[0;M T¡1 + ²T¡1]g: (13)
Substituting (10) in (11), the function to maximize is










(eT ¡ AT ¡ ²T)f (²T)d²T
3
5:
When the agent changes MT¡1 he will a¤ect, in a non-linear fashion, the amount
of reserves available to him on the following period, AT. The agent values this
change for two reasons. First, the bank likes to have more reserves on average.
Second, the new level of reserves will a¤ect the probabilities of going to the
deposit or lending facility as well as the amounts deposited to or borrowed
from the central bank. But, as it is explained in Pérez and Rodríguez [10] the
derivative of the second term with respect to MT¡1 is very close to zero. This
means that we can approximate the solution to this problem as8
argmaxET¡1 [V (AT;e T;i T)] ' argmaxET¡1 (AT):
Evaluating the …rst order condition at the equilibrium produces an interest rate
equal to









The intuition is the same as before. The equilibrium interest rate is an average
of the possible interest rates that could happen should the market be open after
the shock. If the system as a whole is not locked-in (eT¡1 > 0), there are three
possibilities, depending on the size of the shock:
² For shocks ²T¡1 < ¡AT¡1, all banks have to end up borrowing from the
central bank. In that case, the interest di¤erential would be il ¡ id.T h i s
happens with probability F (¡AT¡1).
² On the opposite side, for shocks satisfying ²T¡1 >e T¡1 ¡ AT¡1,b a n k s
accumulate so much reserves that all of them are locked-in. In such cases,
the interest di¤erential should be zero.
8In particular, Pérez and Rodríguez [10] shows that the error derived from the approxima-








17² Finally, for intermediate cases, ¡AT¡1 <² T¡1 <e T¡1 ¡ AT¡1,b a n k s
accumulate reserves but still have a reserve de…ciency that needs to be
resolved in day T. In this case, the equilibrium interest di¤erential should
be equal to the interest rate di¤erential in T, iT ¡ id.
Of course, if we are already locked-in at T ¡ 1 (eT¡1 =0 ), there are two
possibilities depending on whether we end-up the day with a negative or positive
balance:
² For shocks ²T¡1 < ¡AT¡1, all banks have to end up borrowing from the
central bank. In that case, the interest di¤erential would be il ¡ id.T h i s
happens with probability F (¡AT¡1).
² On the opposite side, for shocks satisfying ²T¡1 > ¡AT¡1, banks end up
with excess reserves that are deposited in the central bank. In such cases,
the interest di¤erential should be zero.
4.3.3 Problem at t
The problem is to maximize Et (AT+1) with respect to Mt, when the expectation
is evaluated at the equilibrium level computed before. This problem can be
expressed as





Et [V (At+1;e t+1;i t+1)] (14)
with
At+1 =( 1+it)At + ²t ¡ ct (15)
and
et+1 =m a xf0;e t ¡ max[0;M t + ²t]g: (16)
Applying the same reasoning as before, the solution of this problem can be
approximated by
argmaxEt [V (At+1;e t+1;i t+1)] ' argmaxEt (At+1):
Evaluating the …rst order condition at the equilibrium produces an interest rate
equal to









184.4 The Martingale Hypothesis
Is it true that it = Et (it+1) in this model? From the previous discussion, it
is clear that the state of the system, especially whether the …nancial sector is
locked-in or not, should be important to answer this question. For example, if
the economy is not locked-in at t, (17) expresses the interest rate on that day as
an average over three possible values whose weights depend upon the measures
associated with the three sets
©1t ´f ² : ²t < ¡Atg; (18)
©2t ´f ² : ¡At <² t <e t ¡ Atg; (19)
and
©3t ´f ² : ²t >e t ¡ Atg: (20)
From this expression we see that the validation of the martingale hypothesis will
depend upon two elements. The …rst one is the measure of the set ©2t, since it
is conditional on this set that the martingale hypothesis holds. The other factor
is how di¤erent the expected value of it+1 is from il and id on the sets ©1t and
©3t, respectively. On average, as t approaches T, daily reserves At tend to vary
little while the reserve de…ciency eT tends to decrease. This means that the
set of possible values for the shock where the martingale hypothesis is validated
shrinks as we get closer to the end of the reserve maintenance period. Also, it
is interesting to note that as id ! il, it ! Et (it+1) ! il.
On the other hand, it is not possible to give a general assessment about the
size and sign of these deviations from the martingale behavior. We answer this
question in two ways. First, we will evaluate its sign for the particular case of
a reserve maintenance period of two days. Second, we will present a simulation
where the behavior of the interest rate over longer periods can be computed.
4.4.1 A 2-day reserve maintenance period
In general, using the possible values of iT for each possible shock at T ¡ 1,
ET¡1 (iT) equals

































19Assume the system starts the reserve maintenance period with reserves A1 =
r ´ R=2, so the economy has enough liquidity to satisfy the reserve requirement.
In this case, e1 would be 2r>0. Specializing (??)f o rt h i sc a s ew ew i l lh a v e








F [¡2²1]f (²1)d²1: (22)

































Then, comparing this expression with (22), i1 would be larger, smaller or equal























































²1 ¡ r + il (²1 + r)
¤
f (²1)d²1 (24)






²1 ¡ r + id (²1 + r)
¤
f (²1)d²1: (25)
Since it is assumed that il >i d and we are integrating over values of ²1 satisfying
²1 < ¡r, it turns out that NT <PT and i1 <E 1 (i2).
4.4.2 A Numerical Example
In order to get a view for the behavior of the equilibrium interest rate in this
model the following exercise is conducted. We de…ne a grid for the shock with
probabilities associated with each point. Given the distribution of the shock,
the interest rates of the central bank, il and id, the total reserve requirement R,
and the initial reserve holdings A1, it is possible to compute the distribution for
At and et, t =1 ;:::;T+1. This implies a distribution for it, t =1 ;:::;T.T h e
only problem in working out this simulation is that the number of possibilities
increases exponentially with t. This constraints the size of the grid we can use
if we want to make calculations for a sizable length of the reserve maintenance
period (RMP).
Table 5 includes the values of the parameters used in the simulation.
Table 5
Value of Parameters in Simulation
Parameter Value Meaning
T 11 Length of the RMP
R 1100 Total reserve requirement
A1 100 Initial reserve holdings
il 0.05 Lending rate of central bank
We leave id as a free parameter and do all computations for di¤erent levels of
this coe¢cient. It will take values between 0 and il.
Table 6 represents the distribution of the shock.
Table 6





With his distribution, a bank that starts with reserves A1 and does nothing to
change its reserve holdings will face a probability of borrowing from the central
bank before reaching settlement day of 14 percent.
Figure 4 shows the change of the overnight rate with respect to the value on
the …rst day for each day in the reserve maintenance period, that is,
¢t = it ¡ i1; t =1 ;:::;T:
21Computations are done for two cases only, when id =0and id =0 :03. The …rst
thing we notice is its similarity with Figure 2. The rate is almost constant until
the very last days of the period. Then, it spikes. For the case of no deposit
facility (id =0 ) the average interest rate on the last day of the period is about
32 basis points above what it was at the beginning of the period. With a deposit
rate of 3 percent (which produces a band for the overnight rate of 2 percent,
equal to the one in the euro area), this spike is about 13 basis points.
Figure 5 presents the standard deviation of the unconditional distribution
for the interest rate. We see the familiar pattern of increase in volatility as
the period progresses. From the …gure it is also clear the negative e¤ect that
increases in the deposit rate has on the volatility of this process.
4.5 Intuition and Policy Implications
To interpret these results think of a bank on the …rst day of the reserve mainte-
nance period. We ask the following question: What should the expected interest
rate on a future day t be so as to make this bank willing to substitute a unit of
reserves between those days? When banks decide their demand for reserves they
have to weight the di¤erent costs and bene…ts of increasing their deposits at the
central bank. The cost of not having enough reserves is the lending rate which
is above the daily rate. The cost of having too much reserves is the possibility
of being locked-in earlier in the period and to receive the deposit rate which is
smaller than the overnight rate.
The likelihood of these two outcomes is measured by the probability of having
a shock belonging to the sets ©1t and ©3t, respectively. De…ne these probabilities
as
¼jt = probf²t 2 ©jtg;j =1 ;2;3:
Since the shock is i.i.d. with zero mean, each bank expects its level of reserves,
Aht, to be constant. This means it takes the probability of reaching the set ©1t,
¼1t, to be constant throughout the reserve maintenance period. For the same
reason, the bank expects the reserve de…ciency, eht,t ob ed e c r e a s i n go v e rt i m e .
This implies that, as we get closer to T, ¼2t should be decreasing while ¼3t
should be increasing. The key to understanding the properties of the interest
rate is to look at the evolution of the probability of reaching the set ©3t.A t
the beginning of the period, ¼3t is close to zero. On those days, then, it is more
likely to have a high interest rate, il, than a low one, id. Banks compensate this
expectation by asking for a low rate, it, on those days. This is why, on average,
the overnight rate tends to decrease throughout the reserve maintenance period.
However, as we get close to T, the probability of being locked-in increases a lot.
In that case, the probability of ending up with a low rate is very large. Banks
try to compensate this expectation by bidding up the daily rate and this is why
the overnight rate increases at the end of the reserve maintenance period. It is
easy to see that this e¤ect is smaller the larger the deposit rate is.
This example shows that the spread between the lending and the deposit
rate plays a crucial role in the determination of the statistical properties of
22the overnight rate. This is for several reasons. First, these two rates de…ne
an interval inside which the daily rate has to ‡uctuate. Thus, they limit the
volatility of this series for the whole maintenance period. Second, the rates of the
two standing facilities a¤ect the costs of being locked-in and of borrowing from
the central bank. We show that the relative importance of these costs changes
as we move toward settlement day. In this sense, the deposit and lending rate
also a¤ect the relative variation in the overnight rate within the maintenance
period.
This model can be used to make sense of the empirical …ndings that moti-
vated the paper. As our numerical example shows, the reduction in the oppor-
tunity costs associated with the creation of a deposit facility in the ESCB may
be behind the di¤erences in the level and volatility of the overnight rate experi-
enced after the start of Stage III of the EMU. To have a complete explanation,
though, we have to address one more issue. It has to do with the observation
that the Eonia tends to go down at the end of the maintenance period. As
shown in Figure 4, we would have predicted a small upward peak. This obser-
vation can be reconcile with our model by noticing that the ESCB has been
introducing an excess of liquidity in the system, as it was pointed out above.
An indication of this statement is the fact that the use of the deposit facility
has been much larger than the use of the lending facility.9 In our model, this
means that the central bank is shifting the distribution function of the shock
so that the probability of being locked-in increases. Thus, it is more likely that
rates will drop at the end of the reserve maintenance period.
We believe these results have important implications for policy. Central
banks could achieve a stable pro…le for the overnight rate in two ways. On
the one hand, they could actively try to reduce the volatility of that rate by
intervening in the market at the end of each maintenance period. Alternatively,
they could passively obtain that goal by setting a window for the daily rate with
the two standing facilities. The resources needed to follow the …rst option seem
much larger than what is required to design the second one. This discussion
suggests that the introduction of two standing facilities appears as a preferable
system to stabilize the overnight rate.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents evidence about the time series properties of the overnight
rate in Germany. It shows that the process governing this rate has become
closer to a martingale after the start of the EMU. Additionally, the paper also
documents a reduction in its volatility after January 1999, which is a result of
the smaller variance on the last days of the reserve maintenance period.
9The use of the deposit facility, from February 24th 1999 to May 23rd 2000, has been
almost twice as much as the use of the lending facility. We exclude the …rst maintenance
period after the EMU because the use of the lending facility was atypically high (around 12
times the average of the rest of the periods) probably due to the accommodation to the new
system.
23We develop a model of reserve management by banks that reproduces our
empirical …ndings. An important theoretical implication is that, with an aver-
aging provision for the reserve requirement, banks do not necessarily see funds
on di¤erent days of the same reserve maintenance period as perfect substitutes
even if they expect rates to be constant in the future. In fact, this type of be-
havior implies a process for the interest rate that tends to be higher on average
as we approach settlement day. At the same time, the accumulation of shocks
makes the volatility of the overnight rate to increase over time too. The paper
also shows that these deviations from the martingale hypothesis are reduced
as the spread between the central bank’s lending and deposit rate decreases.
We obtain these results neither by invoking market frictions nor by imposing
noncompetitive behavior. It is just a consequence of paying particular attention
in modeling the opportunity costs faced by banks and how these costs change
as we move along the reserve maintenance period.
Summarizing, it seems that it is the institutional framework of the new
system what is producing a smoother patter for the market rate in Germany.
In particular, we can trace the origin of this change to the introduction of a
deposit facility by the ESCB that it was not in place before the EMU.
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Overnight rate - MRO rate (Sep. 1st 1996: May 23rd 2000)
FIGURE 1
Note: The solid line plots the spread between the overnight rate and the main refinancing operations rate. The vertical lines represent end of the reserve 








Average spreads in Germany: Before EMU
FIGURE 2
Note: The horizontal axis represents the number of days before the end of the maintenance period. The solid line plots the average rate in 








Average spreads in Germany: After EMU
FIGURE 3
Note: The horizontal axis represents the number of days before the end of the maintenance period. The solid line plots the average rate in 
that 








Change in unconditional mean of interest rate
Note: The horizontal axis represents the number of days before the end of the maintenance period. The solid line represents the expected 






2.5 id = 0.0
FIGURE 5
Unconditional variance of interest rate
id = 3.0
Note: The horizontal axis represents the number of days before the end of the maintenance period. The solid line represents the expected 
unconditional variance when the deposit rate is 0%. The dotted line represents the expected unconditional variance  when the deposit rate is 
3%.